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I. Introduction
In its difficult early years, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) was likened by its founding chief justice to a giant without arms and
legs.1 The analogy sought to describe the paradoxical nature of the ICTY insofar as
it is both a powerful institution—given its authority to prosecute high-level govern-
ment officials—and a powerless one—given its lack of any enforcement powers.
Today’s ad hoc international tribunals and the permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) have no direct power to compel states to arrest war crimes suspects and
hand them over for trial. State cooperation is as vital for tribunals as it is resisted by
governments complicit in mass atrocities. Although the tribunals and the ICC prose-
cute individuals only, governments and their leaders often perceive such trials as an
assault on the state itself. Nowhere is this more evident than when a head of state is
targeted, as is now occurring with the ICC’s arrest warrant for Sudan’s Omar Hassan
al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Without power to enforce, the contemporary war crimes tribunals would seem to
lack any leverage whatsoever to bring recalcitrant states into compliance. However,
the hard-won success of the ICTY—which has obtained custody of scores of suspects—
demonstrates that today’s international courts can mount effective challenges against
targeted states. For tribunals, garnering support from key international actors, or
‘‘surrogate enforcers,’’2 is the key to wresting cooperation from a recalcitrant state. In
the face of international pressure, targeted states such as Serbia and Sudan often
mobilize their foreign policy machinery to thwart the tribunals. To counter the tribu-
nal’s attempt to delegitimize the state as an international outlaw, the state seeks to
knock the tribunal off its moral pedestal by highlighting its real and perceived short-
comings.3
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When it comes to the ICC’s quest for cooperation from Sudan, the battle for inter-
national intervention has become even more contentious, particularly given the Secu-
rity Council’s authority to suspend controversial cases. Under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, the ICC’s founding document, the Security Council can actually halt ICC
cases for renewable one-year periods when they are determined to pose a threat to
international peace and security. Thus, even as the ICC looks to the Security Council
to press Sudan to comply with its obligation to cooperate, the Sudanese government
has—in the aftermath of the chief prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant for
President al-Bashir in July 2008—tried to push the Council to invoke Article 16 by
arguing that the ICC is a spoiler of the peace process in Darfur. Long before the chief
prosecutor’s bid for al-Bashir’s arrest warrant, the Sudanese government sought to
play up the damaging consequences of international justice in Darfur by discouraging
international support for the ICC and mobilizing African and Arab allies to magnify
the government’s opposition to the Court. Ever since ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo announced his intention to prosecute al-Bashir—and ever since
the ICC pre-trial chamber4 issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest on 4 March 2009—
the Sudanese government has been increasingly emphatic in its warnings about the
hazards posed by The Hague-based ICC.
To counter Sudan’s framing of the issue, Moreno-Ocampo has argued that a fail-
ure by the international community to back the ICC’s pursuit of al-Bashir and two
other Sudanese suspects will only embolden Khartoum’s criminality. Unless al-Bashir
is forced to account for his alleged crimes, asserts Moreno-Ocampo, the Sudanese pre-
sident will be in a position to direct more violence against vulnerable civilians in
Darfur.5 When it issued the warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest in March 2009, the ICC
pre-trial chamber granted the prosecutor’s request for war crimes and crimes against
humanity charges, but rejected his request for genocide charges. The prosecutor sub-
sequently filed an appeal of the pre-trial chamber’s rejection of the genocide counts.6 It
is too early to determine when or even whether al-Bashir and two other Sudanese
suspects tied to state violence in Darfur will ever face trial at the ICC. Their fate will
depend in no small part on whether Sudan or the ICC wins the peace versus justice
debate by drawing the Security Council, the African Union, and other key interna-
tional actors to its side.
A decade and a half after the establishment of the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), we know a great deal about the dynamics and
outcomes of their battles for cooperation with the states of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Much less is known about the ICC’s ongoing efforts to obtain cooperation
from the Sudanese government as well as from the three other African countries in
which the Court has initiated formal investigations. The aim of this article is to iden-
tify and examine the dynamics of the battles over cooperation fought between the ICC
and the Sudanese government. The foregoing analysis is of course incomplete, given
the ICC’s relatively recent intervention in Sudan and the developing nature of the
case against President al-Bashir. Still, this account aims to highlight the ways in
which the ICC and Sudan have and are likely to continue to wage the battle over
Sudan’s legal obligation to comply with international prosecutions by handing over
suspects and otherwise assisting the pursuit of international justice.
II. Khartoum’s Strategic Defiance of the ICC
The last day of March 2005 represented a watershed for the ICC when the Security
Council authorized the ICC to open investigations in Darfur.7 Because Sudan has not
ratified the Rome Statute which established the ICC, and is therefore considered a
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non-State Party, the Court would have had no authority to investigate atrocities on
Sudanese soil unless it received a referral from the Security Council to do so. How-
ever, as will be discussed below in section IV, it was by no means certain that the
Council would authorize ICC intervention in Darfur, given that the United States,
China, and Russia—all permanent members of the Security Council and each with
the power to veto the Darfur referral—are also non-State Parties.
Well before the start of the ICC’s investigation of the Darfur atrocities,8 the Suda-
nese government had reason to fear that even cases brought against mid-level govern-
ment officials and members of the government-supported Janjaweed militia could
implicate senior leaders, including President al-Bashir himself. Yet, up until Moreno-
Ocampo brought the first charges against two Sudanese suspects in early 2007, the
relations between Khartoum and the ICC were at times cordial.9 While the al-Bashir
government did not allow the Court to open up an office in Khartoum,10 it permitted
ICC investigators to meet with government and judicial officials on five separate occa-
sions,11 primarily to determine if Sudanese courts had the capacity and willingness to
prosecute the cases under ICC investigation. Under the complementarity principle,
the ICC can only prosecute cases that a state is either unable or genuinely unwilling
to prosecute itself. If the ICC determines that a state is unable or unwilling to prose-
cute a case, it then becomes admissible for ICC prosecution. The government’s best-
case scenario was to be seen to cooperate with Moreno-Ocampo’s admissibility probe
and then have the ICC conclude that domestic courts in Sudan should retain the au-
thority to prosecute war crimes suspects sought by the chief prosecutor.
Khartoum’s limited cooperation with Moreno-Ocampo came to an end following
the chief prosecutor’s February 2007 announcement designating two Sudanese sus-
pects for ICC prosecution.12 The prospects for state cooperation grew even dimmer a
few months later when the ICC pre-trial chamber issued arrest warrants for the two
suspects—Ahmad Harun, Sudan’s minister of humanitarian affairs, and Ali Kushayb,
a leader of the pro-government Janjaweed militia.13 Harun, the former interior minis-
ter, and Kushayb face fifty-one counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes re-
lating to atrocities in 2003–2004.14 From early 2007, the government has been largely
hostile toward the ICC. This antagonism has only intensified in the wake of Moreno-
Ocampo’s bid to prosecute President al-Bashir. In response to Sudan’s defiance, the
once conciliatory Moreno-Ocampo has become increasingly critical of the government
and of Security Council inaction.
Well before Moreno-Ocampo sought an arrest warrant for al-Bashir in mid-2008,
Sudan attempted to sideline the ICC and discourage international pressure to co-
operate with the Court. In its campaign against the ICC, the government has honed
a number of strategies used by other states, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Rwanda,
whose nationals have been investigated and targeted for prosecution by the ICTY
and ICTR. First, the al-Bashir government has argued that the ICC prosecutor has
no legal right to prosecute Sudanese citizens and that the prerogative belongs exclu-
sively to the Sudanese courts. To bolster its case, the government argues that it has
not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC nor consented to the obligations binding on
State Parties. However, a Security Council referral to the ICC obliges a non-State
Party, such as Sudan, to fully cooperate with the Court. By the terms of the UN
Charter, a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter is
binding on Sudan as a UN member state.
Sudan has also waged an intensive lobbying campaign to discredit the Court and
its claims of impartiality. That the ICC has been imposed on Sudan against its will,
just as the ICTY was created without Serbia’s consent, has been used by Khartoum
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as evidence that the ICC is a political weapon controlled by the powerful states of the
Security Council. Here, the government has accused the ICC of executing ‘‘a political
agenda of countries targeting Sudan’’15 and pursuing a Western-instigated ‘‘con-
spiracy’’ against the government.16 The government has sought to portray the ICC as
‘‘a tool for the exercise of the culture of superiority’’ of Western states to punish weak
states in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.17 Key to the government’s bid
for impunity is its argument of ‘‘double standards,’’18 specifically, that more powerful
countries such as the United States are effectively immune from ICC scrutiny for
crimes that their military may have committed overseas.19 Yet, at least in Darfur,
the ICC’s pursuit of prosecutions is not one-sided. Moreno-Ocampo has also targeted
Darfuri rebels implicated in war crimes. Toward this end, he is seeking to prosecute
three Darfuri rebels for the September 2007 killing of twelve African Union peace-
keepers in Darfur. In May 2009, one rebel commander, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, volun-
tarily appeared at the ICC for an initial hearing pursuant to a Court summons.20 The
ICC’s targeting of Darfuri rebels has so far done little to soften Khartoum’s defiance.
Indeed, there is the strong likelihood that for the foreseeable future only rebels and
not Sudanese officials will face justice in The Hague.
The Sudanese government has taken the argument of Western bias one step fur-
ther by launching a pan-African appeal for solidarity to thwart the ICC and its bid to
prosecute President al-Bashir. It has portrayed the ICC as a neo-colonial institution
bent on punishing not only Sudan but Africa as a whole. Khartoum has also sought
and received public backing from Arab states by casting the ICC as an enemy of
the Arab world. It is a pillar of Sudan’s claim that the ICC is an anti-African court
because it has so far only opened formal investigations (also referred to as country
situations) on the African continent. This claim of bias ignores the significant ways in
which some African states have engaged the ICC and sought international prosecu-
tions. Indeed, three of the ICC’s four situations (Uganda, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and the Central African Republic)21 were initiated by state referrals to the
Court. The allegations of the ICC’s purported anti-African bias deserve deeper analy-
sis than can be afforded in this article. Suffice it to say here that the question of how
the chief prosecutor selects country situations and particular war crimes cases has
been the subject of increasing scrutiny even among ICC advocates.22 Even as ICC offi-
cials refute the allegations of anti-African bias they are particularly troubling to the
Court. ‘‘It is a very harmful debate for us . . . and it is harmful to perceptions’’ of the
Court, lamented a high-ranking ICC official in a December 2008 interview.23
Sudan’s strategy has not yet derailed the chief prosecutor’s case against al-Bashir.
As of mid-July 2009, the Security Council has not invoked Article 16 of the Rome
Statute to suspend the al-Bashir case. And the near term prospects for such a suspen-
sion seem low, according to ICC observers and diplomats interviewed in mid-2009.24
Nevertheless, Sudan’s anti-ICC campaign, which has been heavily backed by Libya
(whose leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, has held the chair of the African Union since
early 2009) has borne fruit by rallying African and Arab states to publicly oppose the
Court’s pursuit of President al-Bashir. This opposition has so far culminated in an
African Union statement, adopted in early July 2009 at an AU summit in Libya, call-
ing on members not to cooperate in efforts to arrest al-Bashir and turn him over to the
ICC.25 The AU sought to justify its action at the summit by pointing to the Security
Council’s failure to heed the call from African states to suspend the al-Bashir case.26
A campaign, backed by Sudan and Libya, to press African State Parties to the Rome
Statute to withdraw from the ICC has to date not succeeded.27 However, the potential
for this scenario remains troubling for ICC supporters.28
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In the immediate aftermath of Moreno-Ocampo’s mid-July 2008 request for an
arrest warrant for al-Bashir, the African Union and the Arab League came out in
opposition to the chief prosecutor’s bid to prosecute the Sudanese president and called
for the Security Council to suspend the case.29 The Arab League and the African
Union again called for Security Council intervention after the ICC pre-trial chamber
issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest in March 2009. The Arab League decision
garnered significant international media attention, in part because it occurred at a
summit meeting in Qatar in which al-Bashir attended and was warmly embraced
by fellow Arab leaders.30 In an apparent attempt to flout the ICC arrest warrant and
call attention to his considerable regional support, al-Bashir also traveled to Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in March and April. Along with Qatar, these
states have not ratified the Rome Statute and therefore do not have a legal obligation
to arrest al-Bashir. In this respect, the ICC is at a significant disadvantage relative
to the ICTY and ICTR insofar as all UN member states have a legal obligation to co-
operate with these two UN tribunals. The Arab League’s vocal support for al-Bashir is
not surprising because of the lack of pre-existing support for the ICC among Arab
States. Only three Arab League states (Jordan, Djibouti, and the Comoros Islands)
have ratified the Rome Statute. However, the strong backing Sudan has received
from the African Union has come as a particular disappointment to ICC supporters
because thirty African countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute.31
The disappointment of ICC advocates has been sharpened in the wake of the AU’s
July 2009 statement in which African State Parties appeared to disavow their legal
obligation to arrest al-Bashir if he should travel to their countries. The AU’s state-
ment, which poses a significant challenge to the authority of the ICC, has triggered
strong criticism from human rights activists. ‘‘This resolution, the result of unprece-
dented bullying by Libya, puts the AU on the side of a dictator accused of mass mur-
der rather than on the side of his victims,’’ said Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch.32
Meanwhile, Sudanese officials have trumpeted the AU statement as a virtual in-
vitation for al-Bashir to travel freely to African states that have ratified the Rome
Statute and a sign of African unity against the ICC.33 However, the actual level of
popular opposition in Africa to the al-Bashir case and the ICC more generally is far
from clear. Moreover, not all African states that attended the Libya summit appear
to have strongly backed the AU statement.34 However, in the days following the
summit, Botswana appeared to be the only African state to publicly condemn the AU
statement. Botswana’s vice president, Mompati Merafhe, criticized Libya for not
allowing adequate debate on the matter and called on African leaders not to ‘‘try to
undermine the work of the ICC simply because one head of state . . . has been indicted
by the Court.’’35
An important element in Sudan’s campaign against the ICC is to heighten world
fears that support for the Court will undermine the elusive quest for a negotiated
peace in Darfur as well as jeopardize the tenuous 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment that brought an end to Sudan’s devastating north–south civil war. The gov-
ernment’s apparent aim is to shift international scrutiny from its role in the Darfur
atrocities to the ICC’s alleged interference in a possible peace settlement. As far back
as the Security Council meeting of 31 March 2005, Khartoum warned that the ICC
would subvert the peace process.36 Subsequently, the government called Moreno-
Ocampo ‘‘enemy number one of peace in Darfur.’’37 In the aftermath of the chief pro-
secutor’s request for an al-Bashir arrest warrant in July 2008, government officials,
including al-Bashir himself, intensified this line of attack, going so far as to threaten
retaliation if the ICC pre-trial chamber was to issue a warrant for the president’s
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arrest. Beyond that, Sudanese officials issued thinly veiled threats against the vulner-
able, undermanned international peacekeeping force in Darfur.38 The threats of blood-
shed have hardly demonstrated Sudan’s peaceful motives. The recent governor of
south Darfur, for example, warned that if the al-Bashir case moved forward there
would be ‘‘more genocide such as has never before been seen by anyone.’’39
On the one hand, the government has denied a role in atrocities, as when Presi-
dent al-Bashir in October 2008 dismissed allegations of mass rapes of Darfuri women
as fabrications.40 But on the other hand, the government has at times strategically
acknowledged its hand in the violence, apparently to signal to the ICC and the world
that its threats for yet more violence are deadly serious.
Khartoum has sought to blame any increase in violence and danger to Darfuris on
Moreno-Ocampo’s misguided pursuit of prosecutions. However, in the immediate after-
math of the March 2009 arrest warrant, al-Bashir retaliated by targeting the interna-
tional humanitarian presence in Darfur that provided a lifeline to millions of Darfuris.
Al-Bashir expelled thirteen international and three domestic aid organizations that
together had been responsible for providing crucial humanitarian relief to more than
four million vulnerable civilians in Darfur.41 The expulsions sparked dire warnings
over the fate of the vulnerable Darfuris. Al-Bashir sought to justify the expulsions by
accusing these humanitarian organizations of spying on behalf of the ICC.42
For Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, al-Bashir’s actions have confirmed his crimi-
nal intent, making his arrest even more urgent. Still, the unfolding crisis triggered by
the expulsions have, at least in the short term, appeared to soften international pres-
sure for the president’s arrest as Western diplomats have focused on obtaining
Khartoum’s cooperation to allow other humanitarian aid organizations to replace the
expelled groups. In this respect, the United States appears to have taken a concilia-
tory approach toward Sudan, apparently aimed at ameliorating the Darfur crisis and
preventing the collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.43
The Sudanese government’s repudiation of the ICC is both strategic and deeply
felt, according to Western diplomats. ‘‘If there is one thing that can get them out of
their chair, it’s the ICC issue. It’s really, really upsetting for them,’’ remarked a Euro-
pean diplomat who has met with Sudanese officials in Khartoum.44 Beyond declaring
its intent never to hand over indicted suspects, the government has taken steps to
marginalize the ICC and prevent international intervention on behalf of the Court.
Well before the issuance of the al-Bashir arrest warrant, the government used in-
cendiary rhetoric in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that its non-compliance is
non-negotiable. In March 2007, for instance, Interior Minister Al-Zubayr Bashir Taha
promised to ‘‘cut the throat of any international official . . . who tries to jail a Sudanese
official in order to present him to the international justice.’’45 Then in April 2008,
Sudan’s ambassador to the UN, Abdel-Mohmood Mohamad, called for the arrest of
Moreno-Ocampo, accusing him of ‘‘jeopardizing the political settlement in Darfur.’’46
In early June 2008, President al-Bashir reportedly told members of a Security Council
delegation visiting Khartoum that he would cooperate with the Court ‘‘over his dead
body.’’47 The day after the ICC pre-trial chamber issued a warrant for his arrest,
al-Bashir told a pro-government rally in Khartoum that Sudan is ‘‘ready for any
battle’’ against the ‘‘new colonization’’ represented by the ICC.48 Taken together,
these statements may be interpreted as a government bid both to signal the futility
of international pressure and the political price the international community will
have to pay for exerting such pressure.
Yet even as the chief prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir pro-
voked hostile reactions in Khartoum, including government-sponsored protests
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against the ICC,49 government officials in the second half of 2008 offered slender olive
branches to the international community, but not to the ICC. The Sudanese govern-
ment promised that the situation in Darfur would improve, although it only offered
minor concessions toward this end.50 Behind what Human Rights Watch called a
‘‘dual strategy of threats of further violence and promises of progress on the ground’’51
was a drive to convince the Security Council to invoke Article 16 and suspend the
al-Bashir case. However, by the end of 2008, the government’s strategy had not per-
suaded the Security Council.
In its quest for an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case in the second half of
2008, the government argued, as it had when Moreno-Ocampo first opened his inves-
tigation in 2005, that under the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle its courts
are capable of handling Darfur-related prosecutions. Sudan’s allies in Africa and the
Arab world sought to broker a compromise to the crisis over the impending ICC war-
rant by encouraging Khartoum to develop a plan for credible domestic war crimes
prosecutions.52 Toward that end, the government announced the appointment of
a special prosecutor for Darfur.53 And in October 2008, the Sudanese government
announced that it had arrested Ali Kushayb.54 (Government authorities had previ-
ously arrested Kushayb, but then released him in 2007.) But by the end of 2008 scant
progress had been made toward domestic prosecutions and there was little sign that
the government planned to prosecute Kushayb or Ahmad Harun, the other Sudanese
suspect facing an ICC arrest warrant.55 Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo was em-
phatic in his criticism of how little Sudan had done in the realm of domestic war
crimes prosecutions, telling the Security Council in December 2008 that ‘‘in spite of
recent announcements and appointments, nothing—nothing—has been done.’’56 In
another attempt to sideline the ICC, a deal was reportedly explored whereby the
Sudanese government would send Harun and or Kushayb for trial in The Hague in
exchange for an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case. In August 2008, the idea
surfaced with potential support from France and Britain, ostensibly the ICC’s two
strongest backers among the Security Council’s five permanent members. But in
October, momentum for such a deal died after Khartoum stood by its long-held refusal
to hand over the two suspects or to make significant concessions in regard to amelio-
rating the conflict in Darfur.57
In the aftermath of the chief prosecutor’s application of an arrest warrant for
al-Bashir, some Western diplomats and many ICC supporters have scoffed at the sug-
gestion that the Court’s work would jeopardize a resolution to the Darfur crisis given
the moribund state of the peace negotiations. ‘‘Show me the peace process, please,’’
one high-level ICC official said in a December 2008 interview.58 Still, the prospect
that the Court’s pre-trial chamber would issue an arrest warrant raised fears in
many capitals that the Darfur crisis would grow worse at the hands of an embattled
leader. Many diplomats also feared that casting al-Bashir as a pariah would, for as
long as he remains in power, make it difficult for the international community to
directly engage him to find a resolution to the Darfur conflict or ensure the success of
the fragile Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To be sure, the indictment of a sitting
head of state is bound to be highly controversial, even if it is enabled by a Security
Council referral. The central concern is that a cornered al-Bashir would have no incen-
tive to bring the war in Darfur to an end and perhaps every reason to prolong it. Yet,
by holding the keys to the Darfur conflict—either by unleashing more violence or by
working toward its resolution—al-Bashir’s behavior may yet be restrained in the
hopes of obtaining the golden prize of an Article 16 suspension.
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Even before the emergence of the al-Bashir case, some Sudan experts expressed
concern that the ICC’s expected charges against senior officials in Khartoum could
provoke further instability in Darfur, trigger violence in the fragile oil-rich Abyei re-
gion leading to a resumption of the north–south war, and prompt government reta-
liation against humanitarian workers and peacekeepers. For instance, former US
Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew S. Natsios warned of a doomsday scenario in which
new ICC indictments ‘‘will drive the country closer to dissolution.’’59 This, Natsios
feared, could destabilize neighboring countries, disrupt Sudan’s oil exports, and force
an increase in world prices.60 The concern that the pursuit of justice could damage the
prospects of an already elusive peace in Darfur have been sharpened in the wake of
the chief prosecutor’s bid to bring al-Bashir to trial in The Hague and the issuance of
the warrant for the Sudanese president. Yet other experts, including representatives
of prominent international human rights organizations, view the move to prosecute
al-Bashir as a potential catalyst to confronting and ultimately ending the atrocities in
Darfur.
Even prior to the chief prosecutor’s targeting of al-Bashir, the Sudanese govern-
ment argued that the ICC interfered with efforts to bring the Darfur conflict to an
end. Specifically, Khartoum warned that the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb
could disrupt the bid for the deployment of an expanded African Union-UN peacekeep-
ing force in Darfur. President al-Bashir argued that his previous refusal to allow UN
peacekeepers into Darfur was based on his fear that the ICC would take advantage of
evidence possibly collected by the peacekeepers.61 This argument has been refuted by
some analysts who contend that Sudan disingenuously blamed the Court for the gov-
ernment’s long-running resistance to a robust peacekeeping force. These analysts
point to the fact that Sudan’s foot-dragging on allowing an effective peacekeeping force
had begun a year and a half before the Security Council’s 2005 referral of the Darfur
case to the ICC. Moreover, their contention that the government’s announced fear that
the peacekeeping force would be used on the ICC’s behalf is a distortion of the force’s
limited mandate.62
While the ICTY and ICTR have often been stymied by non-cooperation, the states
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have frequently sought to portray themselves
as cooperative in order to avoid international condemnation. When these states have
been accused of non-cooperation, they have often advanced ‘‘good faith’’ reasons for
their behavior, such as a lack of state capacity to locate and arrest fugitives.63 But
Sudan has frequently been unambiguous in its determination to withhold cooperation.
Sudan’s open defiance may serve both as a way to further undermine the ICC and as
an expression of its confidence that the international community will not punish the
government for its non-compliance.
Khartoum has also taken a number of provocative actions to emphasize its opposi-
tion to the ICC. The government has retained Harun in his position as minister of
humanitarian affairs, where he has responsibility over vulnerable refugees in camps
in Darfur. And Khartoum has actually given him the responsibility of investigat-
ing human rights abuses in Darfur and serving as the government’s liaison with the
AU-UN peacekeeping force. ‘‘It’s a real slap to the ICC and the arrest warrants,’’ re-
marked a Western diplomat based in The Hague.64 In the fall of 2007, the government
announced it released Kushayb, who had been arrested by Sudanese authorities on
charges unrelated to the ICC case against him. Then in January 2008, the govern-
ment promoted Musa Hilal—a notorious Janjaweed leader implicated in atrocities
and rumored to be a potential target of the ICC chief prosecutor—as a special advisor
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to President al-Bashir. Court advocates lament that by failing to formally condemn
Khartoum’s defiance, the international community has given Sudan more political
space to thwart the ICC’s calls for compliance.65
Still, the crisis brought on by the prosecutor’s request for an al-Bashir arrest war-
rant has, as discussed earlier, prodded some Sudanese officials to signal a show of
willingness to change their behavior in Darfur. Time will tell whether this takes the
form of substantive concessions and whether this will persuade the Security Council
to exercise its prerogative to suspend the pending ICC case against President al-
Bashir.
III. The Changing Approach of the ICC Chief Prosecutor
The decision of Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo to target a sitting head of state and
to seek charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have brought
the ICC to the center of world attention. The genocide charge in particular has
sparked controversy and renewed the contentious debate over whether the Darfur
atrocities deserve to be categorized as ‘‘the crime of crimes.’’ Key flashpoints in this
controversy have occurred with the release of the UN-authorized International Com-
mission of Inquiry report in 2005, which did not find that genocide had taken place in
Darfur,66 and the United States government’s 2004 determination that genocide had
occurred.67 The genocide debate has received extensive treatment in the academic
literature.68
The chief prosecutor’s high-profile campaign for al-Bashir’s arrest, together with
his pursuit of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, have cast him as a confrontational pro-
secutor not unlike his former ICTY counterpart, Carla Del Ponte. However, Moreno-
Ocampo’s adversarial approach particularly applies to Sudan, the only country in
which the Security Council has asked the prosecutor to investigate violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.69 By virtue of this Security Council referral, Moreno-
Ocampo, as with his counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR, possesses the ostensible
backing of the highest UN body to target senior political and military officials. This
stands in decisive contrast to the ICC’s involvement in Uganda, the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, and the Central African Republic, where the Security Council has
played no role in initiating the Court’s work. With the Security Council’s referral, the
prosecutor is given a level of authority he lacks in the three other country situations in
which he is currently pursuing war crimes prosecutions. Moreover, when it comes to
the Darfur situation, the prosecutor has access to the high-profile forum of the Secu-
rity Council chambers in New York where he issues biannual progress reports and can
thus garner significant international media attention and political leverage in his
quest for cooperation.
For the chief prosecutors at the UN ad hoc tribunals, and particularly at the ICTY,
confrontation has often been critical to securing cooperation. Since the Security Coun-
cil had given them the task of holding scores of trials within a finite period of time and
equipped them with a legal mandate to demand full and immediate cooperation, the
ICTY chief prosecutors often had reason to take a hard line with non-compliant states.
But as seen in key provisions of the Rome Statute, the founders of the ICC envisioned
a more consensual relationship between Court and states. Whereas the Security
Council established the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR, the ICC was created by a multilateral
treaty to which states have to consent in order to join. And whereas the ICTY and
ICTR have enjoyed primacy vis-a`-vis states and the legal authority to usurp domestic
judiciaries, the ICC is more deferential because it is only authorized to prosecute
when a state is either unwilling or unable to do so itself. The spirit if not the letter of
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the Rome Statute also seemed to call on the ICC chief prosecutor to pursue a more
harmonious relationship with states.
Adopting a conciliatory approach in his external relations also appeared to be a
prudent political strategy for Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo to increase the pros-
pects that powerful states opposed to the Court would reconsider their position. A cru-
sading chief prosecutor could quickly alienate State Parties and provoke the wrath of
powerful non-State Parties—the United States in particular—that the Court hoped
to count on for vital assistance. Accordingly, Moreno-Ocampo signaled his deference
to state sovereignty by declining to initiate investigations himself, although the pro-
prio motu powers in Article 15 of the Rome Statute allows him to do so. Article 15
had been a hard fought victory at the 1998 Rome Conference and is viewed by advo-
cates as crucial to ensuring the prosecutor’s independence.70 However, as the first
chief prosecutor of a fledgling institution that relies on state support and seeks to in-
crease the number of State Parties, Moreno-Ocampo initially seemed more concerned
with signaling his accountability to states than in maintaining his independence from
them.71 Still, under pressure from supporters and skeptics alike to demonstrate the
Court’s relevance, Moreno-Ocampo could not wait indefinitely for State Parties to
come to him with referrals of new country situations.
Laboring under these constraints, Moreno-Ocampo adopted a policy of actively en-
couraging referrals from State Parties.72 In effect, the prosecutor asked these states to
ask him to open investigations. This is apparently the route by which the Office of the
Prosecutor came to investigate atrocities in Uganda73 and Congo.74 The strategy of
self-referrals allowed Moreno-Ocampo to avoid the image of an adversarial prosecutor
and helped secure the state’s cooperation in the ICC’s investigations, at least as long
as he did not actually target the Ugandan and Congolese governments’ role in atro-
cities. That these states invited the ICC into their countries could also be later used
by Moreno-Ocampo and other Court officials to deflect the accusations that the ICC
is an anti-African court imposing justice on Africa.75 However, a central concern
of critics, including some prominent legal scholars, is that Moreno-Ocampo’s reliance
on state referrals can lead to a quid pro quo that insulates state officials from ICC
prosecution.76
The chief prosecutor’s strategic conciliation vis-a`-vis Uganda and Congo initially
seemed a harbinger of a timid approach toward Sudan. To the dismay of some inter-
national human rights activists, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo at first avoided
confronting the al-Bashir regime for its insufficient cooperation.77 These activists
asserted that he did little to build the necessary international pressure that might
have bolstered the prospects of cooperation, but instead advanced an acquiescent
image of the ICC and the Office of the Prosecutor.78 Moreno-Ocampo has not been
alone in employing conciliation in a bid for cooperation. The chief prosecutor’s counter-
parts at the ICTY and ICTR have at times also believed that a softer approach offers
the best opportunity to persuade recalcitrant states to provide some cooperation.79
‘‘He had a strategy . . . [that] if he played nice with the regime he would have much
more chance of getting a degree of cooperation,’’ said a prominent NGO official who
has watched Moreno-Ocampo since he began his tenure as chief prosecutor. ‘‘It is a
legitimate kind of thing for him to think about, but I think it was a complete misread-
ing of the way in which his investigation was perceived [by Khartoum] . . . This was a
threat to the regime.’’80 Moreno-Ocampo came under fire from human rights activists
for two apparent overtures to Sudan. First, in his early reports to the Security Council
in 2005 and 2006, he provided favorable assessments of the government’s limited
cooperation. Next came his request to the ICC’s pre-trial chamber in early 2007 for
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a summons rather than arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb. The request for a
summons—which is usually reserved when there is reason to anticipate voluntary
surrender—was apparently made to lower the domestic political fallout to President
al-Bashir of relinquishing the suspects, since it might have allayed the perception of
government acquiescence.81 Nevertheless, the government spurned Moreno-Ocampo’s
overtures. The ICC’s pre-trial chamber did as well, deciding to issue warrants for
Harun’s and Kushayb’s arrests after citing Sudan’s declarations of resistance.82
Some observers maintain there was a sound basis for a conciliatory approach, at
least during the investigation phase when Khartoum was not unequivocally hostile to
the ICC.83 Alex de Waal, a prominent Sudan expert, believes that because Harun and
Kushayb were not from the highest levels of government, Khartoum could have sent
them to The Hague without significant domestic fallout.84 (In the wake of Moreno-
Ocampo’s bid to prosecute al-Bashir, de Waal has grown sharply critical of the pro-
secutor’s ‘‘overreach’’85 as well as his overall performance as chief prosecutor).86
Moreno-Ocampo has also said that the government indicated some interest in surren-
dering Harun after the arrest warrants for him was issued. ‘‘Khartoum was discussing
internally the possibility to remove Harun from the government; they were asking us
questions about the consequences of surrender,’’ Moreno-Ocampo said.87 It was at this
point, he asserts, that international pressure on Khartoum could have played an im-
portant role in the arrest and transfer of Harun and Kushayb to The Hague. But the
UN and European actors declined to make the arrests a priority.88 ‘‘The international
community preferred to deny the facts and the need to enforce the judges’ decision,’’
Moreno-Ocampo said in a stinging rebuke of UN and European acquiescence.89
Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to adopt a confrontational stance toward Khartoum,
which became evident in mid-2007, likely stemmed from a realization that his previ-
ous approach was not yielding results.90 The nature of his relationship with Sudan
had fundamentally changed with the issuance of the first arrest warrants of Sudanese
suspects that implicated the government in a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.
In the eyes of the al-Bashir government, the warrants for Harun and Kushayb
confirmed its long-held fear that the ICC would target the regime itself. Still, for
Moreno-Ocampo to maintain a conciliatory stance by not criticizing Sudan’s blatant
non-compliance would have sorely undercut his leverage and hopes of building inter-
national pressure for the arrests of Harun and Kushayb.
Since the issuance of the arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb, Moreno-
Ocampo has taken an increasingly adversarial stance toward the Khartoum govern-
ment. Moreno-Ocampo’s confrontational approach reached its apex with his request
for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir and the prosecutor’s subsequent campaign, in
the aftermath of the March 2009 warrant, for the president’s arrest. Well before the
al-Bashir case, the chief prosecutor demonstrated more resolve to obtain arrests, as
seen in his audacious plan, in conjunction with some third-party states, to divert an
airplane that Harun was expected to be on en route to the haj pilgrimage in Saudi
Arabia in December 2007. The plan was unsuccessful because Harun got off the plane
after being tipped off. Still, Moreno-Ocampo has used the disclosure of the arrest
attempt to project his determination and the ICC’s global reach. ‘‘As soon as Harun
leaves Sudan he will be arrested,’’ Moreno-Ocampo said in June 2008. ‘‘He is a fugi-
tive. Inside Sudan he could have freedom. Outside Sudan he will be in jail.’’91 The
Khartoum government responded to the news by denouncing the prosecutor’s action
as ‘‘piracy,’’92 calling for his ouster, and announcing that it had filed domestic terror-
ism charges against him.93
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A key component of Moreno-Ocampo’s strategy for international support has been
to argue that the arrests of all three suspects, but particularly al-Bashir and Harun,
are imperative to stopping the violence against Darfuris. Moreno-Ocampo contends
that al-Bashir, as president, and Harun, as minister of humanitarian affairs, are
responsible for ongoing attacks against civilians in Darfur. Even as the magnitude of
atrocities in Darfur has receded from the height of the conflict in 2003–2004, there is
still violence that the prosecutor maintains poses a threat to the survival of members
of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes in Darfur. In his December 2007 address to
the Security Council, the prosecutor sought to implicate Harun in ongoing abuses
against Darfuris in refugee camps, maintaining that the displaced ‘‘are left with no
hope for the present and no prospect for the future.’’94 Moreno-Ocampo pursued a
similar line of attack in his December 2008 speech to the Security Council, his first
address to the Council following his application for the al-Bashir arrest warrant. He
reported on the continuation of rapes, military attacks against civilians leading to
deaths and wide-scale displacement, and government hindering of humanitarian aid.
‘‘Genocide continues,’’ Moreno-Ocampo alleged in his address to the Security Coun-
cil.95 Then in his June 2009 address to the Council he charged that al-Bashir’s expul-
sion from Darfur of more than a dozen humanitarian aid organizations amounted to
a policy of extermination.96 Moreno-Ocampo also has highlighted the emptiness of
al-Bashir’s promise to his citizens, which he made in the fall of 2008, to provide ‘‘jus-
tice to the oppressed.’’97 Pointing to the regime’s effort to cover up crimes by arresting
and torturing human rights activists who have given information to the ICC, the pros-
ecutor sardonically told the Security Council: ‘‘This is the ‘justice to the oppressed’
that President Al-Bashir is talking about.’’98 In sum, in his recent speeches to the
Security Council and other public statements, the prosecutor has tried to deflect
charges that the ICC undermines peace by framing the pursuit of justice as ‘‘the only
realist solution’’99 to preventing the suspects from endangering more civilians.
Without naming art. 16, Moreno-Ocampo, in his December 2008 speech, also coun-
tered the Sudanese government’s efforts to obtain a suspension of the al-Bashir case.
By casting the regime’s attempts at an Article 16 resolution as a means to win impu-
nity for its crimes, the prosecutor sought to pre-emptively shame the Security Council
from taking this course of action. ‘‘President Al-Bashir is trying to convince organiza-
tions and the Security Council that they have to protect him,’’ Moreno-Ocampo told
the Council. ‘‘The international community cannot be part of any cover-up of genocide
or crimes against humanity.’’100 Even as Moreno-Ocampo’s speeches attest to his
increased confrontation with the Sudanese government, they also have underscored
his growing impatience with the Security Council for its timid approach toward
Khartoum.101 Beyond that, the prosecutor has argued that Sudan’s defiance of the
ICC is defiance of the Security Council itself.102
IV. The ICC in Sudan: Security Council Authorization and Ambivalence
Following their March 2005 referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC, Security Coun-
cil members extolled the virtues of the Court and its potential to advance the pursuit
of peace. The French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Marc de la Sablie`re, hailed Security
Council Resolution 1593 as evidence that the ‘‘Council will remain vigilant to ensure
that there is no impunity.’’103 And UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the ICC
‘‘an appropriate mechanism to lift the veil of impunity that has allowed human rights
crimes in Darfur to continue unchecked.’’104 Yet, as the discussion herein shows, the
Security Council grew ambivalent over whether prosecutions of Sudanese officials
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would aid the quest for a durable solution to the Darfur crisis. The Council’s ambiva-
lence has become particularly apparent in regard to the ICC’s bid to prosecute Presi-
dent al-Bashir. As a result, the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation has
not materialized into a sustained commitment to press Sudan to cooperate with the
ICC.
Since its 2005 referral, the Security Council has taken no punitive steps against
Sudan despite its blatant non-cooperation and public declarations that it will never
cooperate with the Court. With the exception of a June 2008 Security Council state-
ment calling on Khartoum to assist the ICC, the Council as a collective has been silent
about Sudan’s obligation to cooperate.105 Analysis of the numerous resolutions and
statements the Security Council has adopted on Sudan, prior to the June 2008 state-
ment, finds no formal criticism or explicit acknowledgement of Sudan’s non-compliance.
Beyond that, Security Council resolutions and statements on Sudan prior to June
2008 included no mention of the ICC and on only two occasions made reference to the
Council’s referral to the Court. When the Council did list the international obligations
Sudan must fulfill—such as supporting the peace process, halting attacks on civilians
and peacekeepers, and expediting humanitarian relief—cooperation with the ICC
was noticeably omitted.106 The Council mentioned the need for justice in some of its
resolutions and statements on Sudan. But it either did so in vague terms,107 did not
specify the ICC’s role in undertaking prosecutions, or indicated, as it did in a July
2007 resolution, that justice is the responsibility of Sudan’s domestic courts.108 In so
bypassing the ICC, the Council (prior to its June 2008 statement calling for Sudan’s
cooperation) backed away from its own commitment to the ICC. Although hardly
noticed by the international media and the outside world, this eliding of the ICC
appeared to reduce the pressure that the government would have otherwise faced
from the Council. ICC advocates have expressed concern that the Council’s failure to
demand Sudanese cooperation threatens to magnify the Court’s impotence.109
The Security Council’s reluctance to confront Sudan for its non-cooperation with
the ICC bears a striking parallel to the Council’s reticence to take action against
Serbia in the 1990s for failing to cooperate with the ICTY. In both instances, the pros-
pect of war crimes prosecutions provided the Council with leverage to curtail state
violence insofar as the tribunals served to warn state leaders that they might one
day face prosecution. The Council’s establishment of the ICTY and the Council’s refer-
ral of the Darfur situation to the ICC have also served other political functions such as
insulating the UN from its failure to take decisive action to halt mass killings by,
instead, taking the moral high ground of seeking international justice. In this respect,
both the creation of the ICTY and the Darfur referral can partially be seen as a way to
distract attention from the UN’s failure to end the violence in the former Yugoslavia
and Darfur.
The Security Council’s reticence to press Sudan to cooperate with the ICC goes
beyond its hope that the government will agree to a negotiated peace settlement in
Darfur. It has also looked to Khartoum to fulfill its promise to allow the full deploy-
ment of an expanded 26,000-strong joint African Union–UN peacekeeping force in
Darfur. (By early March 2009, approximately 15,000 international peacekeepers and
other members of the AU–UN force had been deployed in Darfur.110) Moreover, the
international community has continued to rely on the government to permit the unfet-
tered delivery of humanitarian relief to vulnerable civilians in Darfur who have been
internally displaced by the violence. This dependence on Sudan has, at times, led even
strong ICC supporters such as the European Union to avoid applying sustained pres-
sure on Sudan to cooperate with the Court. As a senior EU diplomat with first-hand
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knowledge of Sudan explained in a May 2008 interview, the ICC fits in the diplomatic
landscape ‘‘like a stone in a shoe.’’111 Said the EU diplomat: ‘‘It would require robust
pressure on the government to [hand over suspects] to the ICC, robust pressure we’re
not inclined to put because of the need to engage’’ on several agendas.112 In sum,
obtaining Khartoum’s cooperation in the quest for peace, peacekeeping, and humani-
tarian relief—as well as its continued support for the endangered Comprehensive
Peace Agreement that brought an end to the north–south civil war in early 2005—
has so far trumped the ICC’s quest for the international community’s political backing
in the prosecution of war crimes.
Since mid-2007, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has issued increasingly strong
calls for the Security Council to press Khartoum to comply with the ICC. Following
the prosecutor’s June 2007 speech to the Security Council, the UN body effectively
shielded Sudan from public criticism by discussing his remarks in private sessions.113
The Council held a public discussion of the cooperation issue following the chief pro-
secutor’s next report to the Council in December 2007. But, again, Moreno-Ocampo’s
criticism of Khartoum did not lead to punitive Council action or even the less serious
step of issuing a Council statement rebuking Sudan for its non-compliance. Even the
rejected Council statement under consideration was relatively mild, at most a re-
minder of Sudan’s legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC.114 The most pro-ICC
states on the Council—France, Britain, and Belgium—maintained that the Council
should hold Sudan to its obligation to fully cooperate because the quest for justice
complemented the pursuit of peace in Darfur while the anti-ICC states—China, Rus-
sia, and Qatar—countered that Council support for the ICC should be subordinated
to the security question. The Russian delegation called for ‘‘a constructive dialogue’’
between Khartoum and the ICC.115 Yet, without Council pressure on Khartoum, the
call for such dialogue would only benefit Sudan and foster the impression that the
Court’s work was vulnerable to political bargaining.
By spring 2008, the ICC chief prosecutor appeared to gain more international sup-
port for his uphill struggle for cooperation. Moreno-Ocampo’s criticisms of Khartoum’s
non-compliance and international inaction, as well as a concerted NGO campaign that
amplified the prosecutor’s calls for cooperation, appeared to strengthen the prosecu-
tor’s hand, particularly in Europe.116 At the end of March 2008, the presidency of the
European Union issued a statement expressing its ‘‘profound dismay’’117 with Sudan’s
lack of cooperation, indicating that further non-compliance would lead to EU action
against Khartoum.
At the Security Council, there was not enough political support for punitive mea-
sures against Sudan in 2008. Still, when Moreno-Ocampo addressed the Council in
early June 2008, he received more backing than ever before, with a majority of mem-
bers favoring a Council statement addressing Khartoum’s non-compliance. In the
prosecutor’s speech to the Council, he called ‘‘the entire Darfur region a crime scene,’’
implicated the ‘‘entire state apparatus’’ in atrocities, and excoriated Khartoum for a
cover-up.118 Ten days after this no-holds barred speech, the Council approved a state-
ment ‘‘urging’’ the government ‘‘to cooperate fully with the Court . . . in order to put an
end to impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur.’’119 The prosecutor’s accusations
of Ahmad Harun’s ongoing responsibility in attacks against victims in refugee camps
may have prompted the Council to break its silence. Significantly, the United States
which held the Council presidency that month also came out in favor of such a state-
ment and by doing so indicated its strongest support of the ICC to date.120 In the
ensuing months, the United States would increasingly play a supportive role for an
institution it had only recently been determined to undermine. Washington’s refusal
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to contemplate supporting an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case even as
France and Britain indicated openness to doing so highlighted the significant evolu-
tion in the United States’ relationship with the ICC.
That Moreno-Ocampo sought and received a Security Council statement in June
2008 seemed designed to bolster his leverage with the Council ahead of his request
for an al-Bashir arrest warrant a month later in July.121 Human Rights Watch hailed
the Council’s June statement, characterizing it as a criticism of Khartoum’s non-
compliance and as a sign of the UN’s impatience with impunity in Darfur.122 Yet the
Council statement lacked any explicit criticism of Khartoum’s non-compliance. More-
over, the Council dropped the explicit reference in the draft statement demanding
Sudan’s compliance with the ICC arrest warrants. Libya, a non-permanent member
of the Council, reportedly would not endorse the statement unless the reference to
the warrants was replaced with the vague and less consequential call for an ‘‘end to
impunity.’’123 For its part, the European Union issued a much stronger statement
of its own. After Moreno-Ocampo addressed the EU foreign ministers on 16 June,
the ministers issued a statement deploring the government’s failure to cooperate and
calling for the handover of Harun and Kushayb.124 Still, at their June meeting, EU
leaders decided to hold off on imposing sanctions against Khartoum. For the rest of
the year, European leaders backed away from their threat of taking concrete action
against the Sudanese regime even as the now targeted President al-Bashir flouted
his defiance of the ICC.
The lack of concerted Security Council action on the ICC issue is a product of the
political interests and divisions among its five permanent members, particularly the
United States, China, and Russia. Yet what is commonly overlooked is that the ICC’s
strongest backers on the Council, Britain and France, have also been ambivalent
about strongly supporting the ICC’s struggle with Sudan. Even as London, Paris, and
other European capitals have been at the forefront of the effort to establish the ICC,
their lack of forceful and sustained pressure on Khartoum has disappointed ICC offi-
cials and Court advocates.125 Still, the ICC’s more fundamental problem has been
with the United States, China, and Russia. All three states have not ratified the
Rome Statute and have generally not been eager to embolden the ICC. However,
the nature of their views toward the ICC and their role in Sudan have differed in key
respects.
Despite its leadership role in establishing the contemporary ad hoc tribunals, the
United States under the Bush administration vehemently opposed the ICC, which it
accused of being unaccountable and a danger to American interests. Particularly in
the early years of the Bush administration, this opposition translated into a diplo-
matic assault on the Court and a coercive campaign to press states to sign bilateral
agreements with Washington promising not to send any American war crimes sus-
pects to the ICC.126 Thus, the United States was initially loath to take any action
that could legitimize the fledgling court.127 Toward that end, US officials made it clear
in early 2005 that the US opposed the nascent plan for the Security Council to refer the
Darfur situation to the ICC.128 Instead, the Bush administration floated a plan for an
ad hoc tribunal for Sudan jointly run by the UN and the African Union. Washington’s
ad hoc tribunal plan did not gain political traction and was effectively criticized by other
states, ICC supporters, and American Darfur activists as a costly and unnecessary al-
ternative.129 In time, the threat of a US veto of the Security Council’s proposed Darfur
referral became untenable because of the likely political damage of blocking interna-
tional prosecutions for atrocities the Bush administration had itself labeled genocide
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only a half a year earlier.130 Not wanting to publicly endorse the ICC, Washington de-
cided to abstain on the vote to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC.
In time, Washington came to regard the ICC’s work in Darfur in a favorable
light, perhaps in no small part due to the high-profile status of the Darfur issue
in the United States and the formidable pressure exerted by the American-based
Save Darfur movement to stand against impunity in Sudan.131 Moreover, just as
the ad hoc ICTY had been a useful tool for the United States and its allies to isolate
the rogue leader of Serbia, there was no reason why the ICC, at least in the context
of the Darfur situation, could not serve a similar purpose for the United States.
Indeed, the Security Council referral could serve American interests because the
Council’s action had, in effect, deputized the global court to serve as an ad hoc tribunal
for Darfur. Late in the Bush years, US officials reached out to the Court, indicating
they would actually cooperate with the ICC in its Darfur investigations if so re-
quested.132 Yet the strongest form of US support came in the second half of 2008
when the Bush administration announced its opposition to any Security Council at-
tempt to invoke Article 16 to suspend the al-Bashir case. Even as France and Britain
explored a possible deal to suspend the case, Washington, in sharp contrast to its
earlier position on the ICC, claimed the moral high ground. ‘‘There is no compromise
on the issue of justice,’’ said Alejandro Wolff, the deputy US representative to the UN,
in early August.133 Remarkably, in only the span of a few years, the United States has
gone from being the ICC’s arch-nemesis to its most reliable ally, at least when it per-
ceived that providing backing for the Court in Darfur advanced American interests.
Yet finding common cause with the ICC did not mean that the United States govern-
ment, under Republican George W. Bush or Democrat Barack Obama, would fully em-
brace the Court by becoming a State Party to the Rome Statute.
American opposition to an Article 16 suspension, at least in the run-up to the pre-
trial chamber’s decision on the al-Bashir arrest warrant, greatly diminished the pros-
pects of such a suspension since an opposing vote of only one permanent Council mem-
ber can block a suspension. Anticipating failure may have thus dissuaded China and
Russia from mounting a vigorous public campaign. Such a campaign was not only likely
to fail but also could incur a blow to their global standing by closely linking Beijing and
Moscow in the effort to immunize President al-Bashir from prosecution.
As Sudan’s most important political patron, China has reaped concrete benefits
from its relationship with Khartoum, not least of which has been substantial crude oil
imports—Sudan is China’s largest foreign supplier134—and the extension of Chinese
influence in a strategic part of Africa. Sudan, too, has enjoyed the benefits of its rela-
tionship with China, given Beijing’s role as a major supplier of arms135 and China’s
significant investment in Sudanese industry.136 Beyond that, China’s political backing
during the Darfur crisis has proven indispensable for Sudan. China’s support has
helped to soften the blow of international condemnation and to avoid some punitive
measures from the international community, such as a maritime blockade of its
ports,137 which might have forced Khartoum to alter its policy in Darfur. Significantly,
however, the political protection China has offered Sudan did not extend to a Chinese
veto of the Security Council referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC.
China is no friend of the ICC. Since the Rome Conference of 1998, it has been
strongly opposed to key provisions of the Court’s Statute. Yet, when it came time to
the vote on the Darfur referral, Chinese leaders preferred to avoid risking the condem-
nation that may have come from scuttling any possibility of international justice for
Darfur. Instead, Beijing, like Washington, abstained. China ‘‘could not vote no since
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the crimes in question are unjustifiable,’’ observed Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a French ex-
pert on China. ‘‘It often finds itself in this neutral position since it does not want to
have the finger of blame pointed at it.’’138
As the Darfur crisis has worn on, China has found itself increasingly subject to
international censure, especially from human rights activists in the West, who have
criticized Beijing for complicity in atrocities by enabling and arming the Khartoum
regime. As international scrutiny of Chinese human rights practices at home and
abroad intensified during the long run-up to the 2008 August Olympics in Beijing,
China sought to enhance its international image by being seen to play a constructive,
diplomatic role in Darfur.139 Thus, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s request for an
arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, less than a month before the Olympics, came
at a particularly sensitive time for the Chinese government. In this context, China
risked a deep, self-inflicted wound if it had lead or strongly supported efforts to sus-
pend the case against a potential genocide suspect.
To be sure, China did express opposition to Moreno-Ocampo’s bid to prosecute
al-Bashir, criticizing the move as ‘‘an inappropriate decision taken at an inappropriate
time’’140 that could make it more difficult to resolve the Darfur crisis. Beyond that,
an arrest warrant would obviously complicate Chinese diplomacy in Sudan. As Liu
Guijin, China’s envoy for Darfur, asked rhetorically, ‘‘How can you rely on a criminal
suspect to be a responsible partner for the Darfur political process?’’141
Not long after the chief prosecutor’s mid-July 2008 request for an arrest warrant,
China signaled support for ‘‘the reasonable request’’142 of Sudan’s African and Arab
allies for an Article 16 resolution at the Security Council. Yet Beijing was careful not
to go beyond these measured statements of support for Sudan and its African and
Arab backers. However, as the global spotlight on China faded several months after
the Olympics and the announcement of the ICC’s pre-trial chamber’s decision ap-
peared imminent, Beijing in early January 2009 signaled stronger support for halting
the al-Bashir case, arguing that an ICC indictment would lead to ‘‘disastrous’’ con-
sequences for Darfur.143 Still, China indicated that it preferred to have one of the
Security Council’s three African members take the lead by introducing an Article 16
resolution.
For the most part, Russia has followed China’s lead when it has come to the ICC
and the al-Bashir question. However, in contrast to both China and the United States,
Russia voted to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC. While Russia has supplied the
Sudanese military with arms—including airplanes and helicopter gunships linked to
Sudanese bombing attacks in Darfur144—its relationship with Khartoum is not as
close as China’s. Still, like Beijing, Moscow has criticized Moreno-Ocampo’s bid to pro-
secute al-Bashir, indicated support for the African and Arab campaign for a suspension
of the case, and credited Sudan’s role in working toward a diplomatic resolution of the
Darfur conflict.145
VI. Conclusion
In Sudan, the ICC faces a government as defiant as any that the other contemporary
international war crimes tribunals have confronted. When it comes to the prosecution
of members of their own national, political, or ethnic group, states employ a range of
strategies to withhold cooperation and to limit the political cost of doing so. But with
its statements of contempt and intimidation—and its expulsion of more than a dozen
humanitarian aid groups from Darfur after the issuance of the arrest warrant for
President al-Bashir—Khartoum has taken such defiance to a new level.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:3 December 2009
320
In June 2008, the Security Council’s statement calling for Sudanese compliance
with the ICC appeared to demonstrate a new resolve to press the government and
defend the integrity of the Council’s authority. After more than a year of allowing
Sudan’s resistance to go unchallenged, the Council’s statement indicated there may
be a limit to its passivity. But then a month later in July, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo’s request for an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir seemed to weaken
the Council’s new backing of the ICC. The question then shifted from whether the
Security Council would act as a ‘‘surrogate enforcer’’ on behalf of the ICC to whether
it would instead intervene on Sudan’s behalf by bringing the wheels of international
justice to a halt. As the ICC pre-trial chamber quietly considered Moreno-Ocampo’s
request for an arrest warrant, Sudan and its regional advocates—the African Union
and the Arab League—called on the Security Council, the court of last resort, for an
Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case.
Sudan’s bid for an Article 16 suspension has proven difficult, given the power of
any of the five permanent members of the Security Council to block such a move.
Moreover, for the Council to suspend the case could be interpreted as a repudiation of
its original justification for referring the Darfur situation to the Court. The Council’s
referral was premised upon the assumption that international justice would help
counter the threat to international peace and security posed by the inhuman violence
in Darfur. But a decision to suspend the al-Bashir case would require the Council, in
effect, to find that the ICC’s case vis-a`-vis Darfur posed a threat to peace and security.
For the ICC’s predecessors, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, such direct Security Council intervention is disallowed
because it would be viewed as blatant obstruction of international justice. But the
ICC operates under different ground rules and a different conception of the proper
relationship between the Security Council and the prosecutorial and judicial wings of
the Court. In a compromise agreed to in the final days of the founding Rome con-
ference, states adopted Article 16,146 the provision in the Statute that permits the
Security Council to suspend for renewable one-year periods any ICC case it deems a
threat to international peace and security. That the Security Council is required to
make such a finding regarding peace and security provides the incentive for targeted
states as well as rebel groups to frame their assault against the ICC on the claim that
international justice endangers peace.
As the ICC pre-trial chamber deliberated over the legal merits of the prosecutor’s
application for an arrest warrant in the second half of 2008, Sudan called on the Secu-
rity Council to heed the alleged disastrous consequences of allowing the ICC to pro-
ceed. However, by the end of 2008, there were signs of growing support among key
Council members to refrain from suspending the al-Bashir case.147 There were also in-
dications that some of Sudan’s African and Arab allies had grown wary of Khartoum’s
truculence, particularly its refusal to engage the Court by not seriously pursuing credi-
ble domestic war crimes prosecutions as an alternative to ICC trials.148 Instead,
the al-Bashir government maintained its campaign of fear, telegraphing to the world
how much it stands to lose by not intervening to stop the ICC’s judicial interven-
tion in Sudan. In this campaign, Khartoum has skillfully played the ‘‘instability
card,’’149 painting grim scenarios in which an unaccountable and remote ICC would
reignite the Darfur crisis and perhaps even the dissolution of Sudan itself. The pros-
pect that the ICC could trigger a deterioration of the Darfur crisis—even if the vio-
lence was cynically driven by Khartoum to substantiate its claims that justice under-
mines peace—has been Sudan’s most potent weapon in its fight with the ICC. While
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Sudan has not won an Article 16 suspension of the al-Bashir case, it has nevertheless
undermined the standing of the Court. This is punctuated by the African Union state-
ment of early July 2009 that calls on African states not to cooperate in arresting the
Sudanese president. The backlash against the ICC—which some ICC supporters have
feared could lead African State Parties to withdraw from the Court—points to the
inherent risks in targeting an African head of state.
Even as Moreno-Ocampo’s announced intention to prosecute al-Bashir greatly
increased the ICC’s profile and thrust the tarnished Sudanese president on the defen-
sive, the chief prosecutor has found himself facing accusations of spoiling the pros-
pects of peace in Darfur. It is in this highly politicized context that Moreno-Ocampo
and his advocates in the international human rights community have sought to gain
the upper hand by reframing the peace versus justice debate in their own favor. The
struggle with Khartoum is not only about fulfilling the Court’s central mission of
prosecutions in its most high-profile situation. Also at stake is the ICC’s legitimacy
and viability as a permanent court of global justice. Whether or not the Security Coun-
cil invokes Article 16, the al-Bashir case will be closely watched by present and future
targeted states and rebel groups looking to win reprieves from international justice.
Central to the chief prosecutor’s campaign for cooperation in Sudan has been to argue
for the indispensable role that the ICC can play, in conjunction with a resolute inter-
national community, in ameliorating the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
Giving no ground to his critics, Moreno-Ocampo has argued that it is a pragmatic
imperative for the world to press for the arrest of Sudanese suspects most responsible
for atrocities—atrocities that pose an enduring threat to stability in the region and to
the survival of entire communities in Darfur.150
In his quest for Sudan’s cooperation and Security Council backing, Moreno-
Ocampo has presented himself as a determined, uncompromising prosecutor willing
to challenge state sovereignty. In this respect, the chief prosecutor we see in the Dar-
fur situation stands in marked contrast to the same chief prosecutor who has been
careful to avoid targeting state authorities in Uganda, Congo, and the Central African
Republic. When it comes to Darfur, Moreno-Ocampo has warned the Security Council
that ‘‘inaction and business as usual’’151 are acts that help perpetuate the crimes. But
even as he stands apart from the Security Council—going as far as to cast himself as
its moral conscience—the prosecutor has emphasized that targeting Sudanese sus-
pects and campaigning for state cooperation is not the work of a rogue prosecutor,
but a responsibility mandated to him by the Council itself. ‘‘The Security Council
requested judicial intervention,’’ Moreno-Ocampo reminded the Council in December
2008, as a prelude to calling for decisive action in seeking al-Bashir’s arrest. It
remains to be seen whether the Security Council heeds or abandons its own request
for international justice.
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